A somewhat older literature, supported by considerable empirical evidence, considered the multinational …rm's mode choice for foreign production between an owned subsidiary and a licensing contract in an environment where the …rm is transferring primarily knowledge-based assets. An important assumption in this literature is that the relevant knowledge is absorbed by the local manager or licensee over the course of time: knowledge is non-excludable; More recently, a number of papers have adopted a property-right view of the …rm, and assume the application abroad of physical capital and assume that ownership rights guarantee that the owner retains full and exclusive rights to the capital should a relationship break down. In this paper we combine both forms of capital assets in a single model. The model predicts that foreign direct investment (owned subsidiaries) is more likely than licensing when the ratio of knowledge capital to physical capital is high, or when market value is high relative to the book value of capital (high Tobin's-Q). We believe that this prediction is consistent with existing empirical evidence.
1. Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown at rates greatly outpacing the growth in world trade over the last several decades. This has naturally led to increased interest in FDI by academic researchers and policy makers. Part of that interest has been directed to the determinants of the choice of mode by which …rms service foreign markets, including options such as exporting, owned foreign a¢ liates (FDI), licensing and subcontracting, and joint ventures. This in turn relates to more general discussion in microeconomics about the "boundaries of the …rm": decisions as to which activities should be undertaken within the ownership structure of the …rm, and which activities should be contracted or outsourced to arm's-length …rms.
There is a rich and extensive literature on the boundaries of the …rm, and we can make no attempt to survey it here. Instead, we will direct our e¤orts along lines which have been productive in the …eld of international trade, where researchers have attempted to model a multinational's decision as to whether to establish a foreign subsidiary or contract with a foreign supplier to produce a good for local sales or for export back to the parent …rm.
These questions use to be referred to as the "internalization"problem, but more recently are being referred to by the converse label, "outsourcing". But they are really the same thing:
whether or not to internalize an activity inside the …rm, or to outsource it to an arm's-length …rm.
Physical Capital, Knowledge Capital and the Choice Between FDI and Outsourcing
Much of the more recent literature under the name outsourcing has drawn from an approach which, we assert, focuses on properties of physical capital such as plant and equipment. On the other hand, the empirical literature and recent theoretical literature has emphasized the importance of knowledge-based assets in explaining the decision to become a multinational …rm. An earlier theoretical literature under the internalization label also took the latter approach.
The purpose of this paper is to inquire whether or not the nature of the capital required by a subsidiary makes an important di¤erence to the choice of mode, either subsidiary or licensee. Speci…cally, we wish to di¤erentiate between physical capital and knowledgebased capital assets, and ask whether a more physical capital-intensive …rm will be more or less likely to chose internalization via a subsidiary rather than outsource compared to a knowledge-capital-intensive …rm.
As just alluded to, the somewhat older literature assumed knowledge-based assets and in particular assumed that the multinational …rm (the principal) cannot prevent a licensee (the agent) from absorbing or learning the relevant knowledge over time. Even though the multinational "owns" the knowledge-based asset, it gets transferred to a licensee. This literature emphasizes the jointness property of knowledge capital, the ability to use it fully in multiple locations at the same time (Markusen's (2002) knowledge-capital model), which leads to multi-plant production in the …rst place. It suggests that the jointness properly also leads to the problem of asset dissipation: knowledge-assets are easily transferred but also easily absorbed by the licensee. Formal models include Horstmann and Markusen (1987) By contrast, more recent literature is focused around the Grossman-Hart-Moore property-right approach (Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) ), which seems (implicitly) more appropriate for physical capital in that the relevant asset has no jointness property and that the owner of the residual rights has full control of the asset if a relationship or negotiation breaks down. Important papers include Helpman (2002, 2004) , Antrás (2003 Antrás ( , 2005 , and Feenstra and Hanson (2005) .
Our model combines the two approaches in a simple two-period incomplete-contracting model. A …rm requires both physical and knowledge capital for a foreign subsidiary, along with non-contractible e¤ort by a foreign licensee or manager. E¤ort is relatively more important as a complement to physical capital than knowledge capital, creating the wellunderstood advantage for using a licensee who owns the physical capital and thus captures the full bene…t of his or her e¤ort. However, knowledge capital transferred by the multinational is absorbed by the licensee during the …rst period regardless of who "owns" it. We assume that the value of this knowledge to a manager or licensee outside the relationship depends on working with the physical capital, the two assets being complements. Thus the advantage to the multinational in owning the physical capital is that it reduces the incentives or ability of the licensee to use the knowledge for private or outside uses in period 2.
This tension, ownership by the multinational reduces agent's e¤ort while preserving the value of the knowledge capital, is the fundamental di¤erence between the present paper Physical Capital, Knowledge Capital and the Choice Between FDI and Outsourcing and previous ones. Our result is that …rms that are more physical-capital intensive will tend to license (outsource), while …rms that are more knowledge-capital intensive with tend to establish subsidiaries (internalize). We believe that this is consistent with all available empirical evidence.
We are of course aware that some existing literature emphasizes that capital-intensive …rms are more like to establish subsidiaries (Antrás 2005) , but this refers to capital use relative to labor and materials, not to physical versus knowledge-capital intensity. Our model does not o¤er cross-section predictions about mode choice as a function of industry or …rm capital-labor ratios. Rather, our predictions would more appropriately be examined by using a type of Tobin's q; speci…cally, the ratio of a …rm's market value (re ‡ecting knowledgebased assets as well as physical capital) to its book value of capital (largely re ‡ecting physical capital only). Our prediction would be that …rms/industries with higher q's would be more likely to establish foreign subsidiaries. Existing evidence, reviewed in Markusen (1995 Markusen ( , 2002 does indeed suggest that this is the case. Teece (1986) , and Wilson (1977) show technology is more likely to be transferred internally within the …rm by R&D intensive …rms producing new and technically complex products. Licenses are used to transfer older technologies. Blomstrom and Zejan (1991) get similar results with respect to joint ventures: …rms are less likely to seek a foreign partner when intangible assets are important. Ferrantino (1993) , Lee and Mans…eld (1996) , and Mans…eld (1984) include …ndings that weak protection of intellectual property lead to exports rather than either licensing of FDI and/or promote FDI over licensing and the choice between wholly and partly owned subsidiaries.
Smith (2001) …nds that stronger foreign patent rights increase US …rms transfers of knowledge more by licensing than by a¢ liate sales. Yang and Maskus (2001) …nd that countries with stronger patent rights attract larger arm's-length volumes of licensed technology, although licensing is not compared to FDI. Maskus, Saggi and Puttitanum (2005) …nd that stronger patent protection increases the probability of inward FDI and has very little e¤ect on licensing; but they note that this overall …nding is driven by high technology sectors, and that lower technology sectors have the opposite result (stronger protection increases licensing more than FDI). There are two periods of production, t = 1; 2, and there is no discounting. At the beginning of t = 1, M makes a once-for-all choice between two possible organizational forms: foreign direct investment (FDI) or outsourcing. With FDI, M acquires (and owns) the physical capital used for production in the South and employs A under a one-period employment contract to manage a production process utilizing M 's capital. Both capital acquisition and A's hiring occur at the beginning of t = 1. A's employment contract is re-negotiated at the beginning of t = 2. M also decides each period how much intellectual capital to transfer to A to be utilized in production. With outsourcing, A acquires (and owns) the physical capital, with capital acquisition again occurring at the beginning of t = 1. M signs a one-period licensing contract with A that licenses an amount s 1 of M 's intellectual capital to A for use in production at t = 1. This licensing agreement is re-negotiated at the beginning of t = 2, with an amount s 2 transferred at t = 2.
In our model to come, stronger foreign patent rights and intellectual property protection can be thought of as increasing x, thus making outsourcing more attractive, a result consistent with these empirical …ndings.
Physical Capital, Knowledge Capital and the Choice Between FDI and Outsourcing
As in Grossman and Hart (1989) , ownership of physical capital bestows control rights on the owner. Speci…cally, the owner can decide the uses to which the capital can be put and can exclude access to the capital for any other uses at any time. That having been said, the owner cannot typically control how intensively the capital is used in a given activity. We capture these features of physical capital by assuming that there is an exogenous and …xed amount, K = K, that is required to produce in any period. We think of this assumption on capital as simple means of capturing some characteristic of the production technology used in the industry in which M operates. The cost of K is r per unit and the owner of K decides in what production activities K is used. Production at t = 1 results in depreciation of the physical capital asset. The extent of depreciation depends on e¤ort, e, exerted by A in using the asset "properly". The amount of capital passing into period 2 is given by
Since an amount K is required for production in each period, the less e¤ort exerted by A; the higher are the capital costs for the owner of capital at t = 2. E¤ort is unobservable by M and so uncontractible for M ; e¤ort is costly for A, with e¤ort cost given by the increasing, convex function C = c(e) > 0.
Intellectual capital, by contrast, does not have the same excludability properties. The owner of intellectual capital may not be able to control to the same extent the uses to which the capital is put and to capture the returns that the intellectual capital generates. In essence, property rights to intellectual capital are harder to de…ne and protect than is the case for physical capital. We capture these features of intellectual capital in the following way. We assume that, at t = 1, there exists a fraction x < 1 of S that is "explicit knowledge"
Physical Capital, Knowledge Capital and the Choice Between FDI and Outsourcing in the sense that the uses of this part of M 's intellectual capital can be de…ned in a t = 1 licensing agreement, they can be measured and the returns appropriated by M . In this sense, the fraction x of M 's intellectual capital can be "owned"in the same way as physical capital is owned. A fraction 1 x of S is "tacit knowledge"and is not contractible at t = 1 in the sense that its current and future uses cannot be controlled by M in a t = 1 licensing agreement and any returns that it generates cannot be speci…cally appropriated by M in the agreement. The value of x is assumed to be exogenous to the …rm and can be thought of as capturing either characteristics of the intellectual capital utilized by M or a characteristic of the legal regime of the country in which M is contracting. For simplicity, we assume that all intellectual capital is contractible at t = 2. We assume further that M is endowed with The gross surplus that accrues to M and A from production at t = 1 is given by U (K; s 1 ) 0, with U (K; s 1 ) = 0 for all K < K, U (K; 0) = 0 and U 2 > 0. The gross common (i.e., excluding any private bene…ts that may accrue to A) surplus accruing to M and A should they contract at t = 2 is given by V (K; s 2 ) B(K B ; s 1 ) > 0, with 1, V 2 > 0 and V (K; s 1 ) = 0 for all K < K, V (K; 0) = 0. The assumptions that surplus cannot be generated by intellectual capital alone and that surplus is increasing in s captures the idea that physical and intellectual capital are complements in our setting.
If M chooses FDI at t = 1; then we assume that there is a perfectly elastic supply of agents with opportunity cost W 0 available to M in each period to utilize as employees.
Should M choose outsourcing at t = 1, then, again, we assume that A has an opportunity cost of W at t = 1 (and of at least W at t = 2). In both the case of FDI and outsourcing, we assume that the agent not owning capital at t = 1 (M in the case of outsourcing and A in the case of FDI) is not able to raise the amount K su¢ ciently quickly to be able to produce alone at t = 2. This fact produces a (potential) speci…c relationship between M and A at Physical Capital, Knowledge Capital and the Choice Between FDI and Outsourcing t = 2. In this case, the t = 2 surplus is allocated based on the Nash bargaining solution.
Both A and M are risk neutral and make choices to maximize expected income. 
Analysis
We begin by analyzing the complete contracting case so as to provide a benchmark for the subsequent analysis of the incomplete contracting situation. For the incomplete contracting case, we analyze …rst the FDI contract equilibrium and then the outsourcing equilibrium.
Finally, we compare equilibrium payo¤s for M and determine the situations in which M prefers FDI to outsourcing.
The complete contracting case
The complete contracting solution is given as the solution to the problem Since both U (K; s 1 ) and V (K; s 2 ) are increasing in s and M can control whether or not A uses S for private purposes with complete contracting, M chooses s 1 = s 2 = 1: Further, since 1, the contract prohibits A from undertaking the private project as doing so decreases total surplus. The level of e¤ort for A is is given by e , de…ned by the condition
Equilibrium under FDI
We begin by analyzing the equilibrium contract at t = 2. Since M owns the physical asset under FDI, M can control the use of K at t = 2. Given > 1, even were M able to capture all of A's bene…t, B( ), M would be worse o¤ allowing A to utilize M 's capital than not. As a result, the contract that M o¤ers A restricts A to using K only for M 's project (i.e., the contract prohibits a from using K in A's private project). Formally, the contract sets K At t = 1; M will optimally choose s
) is increasing in s 1 and the payo¤ at t = 2 is independent of the value of s 1 . Further, since e¤ort is costly for A and A's compensation at t = 2 is independent of e, A will choose e F = 0. M , recognizing this fact, o¤ers a payment of w
We summarize these results below Proposition 1 Under the FDI option, the unique equilibrium contract pair is s 
Note that, under FDI, the equilibrium contract is a standard wage-employment contract.
The agent employee exerts no e¤ort in maintaining physical capital and undertakes no tasks other than those involved in working directly for M . The contract allows M , via control of Physical Capital, Knowledge Capital and the Choice Between FDI and Outsourcing physical capital, to control the use of M 's intellectual capital. As such, the contract exhibits the oft discussed features of an insourced activity (see Williamson (198 ) : low-powered incentives (and so problems of moral hazard) but control over asset use. In order to undertake production at t = 2, A must invest in replacement capital and so incurs capital cost, under any scenario, of r K(1 e). As a result, A's net payo¤ under the
Equilibrium under outsourcing
Two features of the equilibrium contract at t = 2 are worth noting. First, if s 1 > x, then a higher s 1 reduces M 0 s equilibrium payo¤ at t = 2. This occurs through two channels.
First, since A already possesses s 1 x knowledge capital that cannot be taken back by M;
it makes A less dependent on M 's knowledge capital in production. This means A will pay a lower license fee to M for the (main) production. Second, s 1 enables A to have an outside project that reduces M 's value and so again lowers the license fee. The other feature worth noting is that A is the residual claimant on the returns to e¤ort. Since A also bears the full cost of e¤ort, A will have incentives to exert the …rst-best e¤ort level. This is shown below.
Turning to the t = 1 contract, since there is a perfectly elastic supply of agents at (s 1 > x is not contractible) nor capture returns at t = 1 from doing so and since M 's returns at t = 2 are decreasing for s 1 > x, the equilibrium licensing contract at t = 1 is
Under the equilibrium pair of outsourcing contracts, A's payo¤ is Note that outsourcing generates e¢ cient e¤ort by the agent but leads to ine¢ cient transfer of intellectual capital. FDI, by contrast, leads to e¢ cient transfer of intellectual; capital but shirking by the agent. Below we investigate the circumstances under which one option is preferred to the other.
Equilibrium Choice of Organization Form
To determine M 's choice between FDI and outsourcing, consider the payo¤ di¤erence under the two options. This di¤erence is given by To proceed further with an analysis of the environments -K; x pairs -in which M chooses FDI or outsourcing, we need to make some assumptions about the ways that gross surplus varies over this space. Speci…cally, we need to make assumptions on the behavior of U K; 1 U K; x and V K; 1 r K. Recall that environments with larger values of K represents ones in which the production technology is more physical capital, relative to intellectual capital, intensive. Based on this notion, we assume in what follows that i) for any value of x and for all K, U K; 1 U K; x is non-increasing in K and ii) V K; 1 r K is decreasing in K. The …rst condition states that, the more physical capital intensive is the industry, the less impact reductions in intellectual capital have on gross surplus in the …rst period. In essence, this condition represents our de…nition of physical capital intensive industries. The second condition implies that the moral hazard problem is more severe for industries that are more physical capital intensive. higher returns at t = 1 than Firm 2 (U K; 1 > U K; x ). Second, since intellectual capital greater than x is tacit, Firm 1's book value (physical capital value plus the value of explicit intellectual capital) at t = 1 will be lower than Firm 2's: These two facts combined suggest a relationship between Tobin's q and outsourcing -…rm's with high Tobin's q are more likely to be using FDI while …rm's with low Tobin's q are more likely to be outsourcing.
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined how the non-excludability of intellectual property leads to the ownership of a complementary asset, in our case capital, as a means of protecting intellectual
property. The result we …nd is that …rms that are largely dependent on intellectual property for their returns will protect these returns by engaging in FDI rather than outsourcing. The ownership of capital protects the returns of the complementary asset, intellectual property.
The cost of this ownership is weak incentives for …rm management. Firms whose returns rely little on intellectual property and mainly on physical capital outsource to provide stronger management incentives. An implication of these facts is that …rms that choose FDI will have larger values of Tobin's q, all else equal, than will …rms that outsource.
